Johnny Logic

A Short Critique of Conceptual Analysis

I must admit some disingenuousness about my post on Blockheads and Other Brutes. The method employed there, namely, conceptual analysis, is, in my opinion, highly problematic. Conceptual analysis is the philosophical process of refining our notions about things to clarify relationships, possibilities, necessities and impossibilities. Philosophy is littered with thought experiments meant to provide grist for conceptual analysis: Twin Earth, The Veil of Ignorance, Plato’s Cave, Descartes’ Demon, Swampman, Blockhead…

Those with knowledge of formal systems will recognize the formal terms being bandied about without grounding in any explicit formal system. If we take seriously claims about modal properties (necessity, possibility and impossibility), formally, they are proven by showing, relative to a set of axioms (and rules of inference), a statement produces a contradiction if denied, may be constructed, and simply implies a contradiction, respectively. “Relative to a set of axioms (and rules of inference)” is an important part of that formulation and is, often to all appearances, forgotten by philosophers. For example, some philosophers claim that zombies are possible. Possible under the scope of which assumptions? Many things may seem possible without the relevant constraints. How would one demonstrate possibility, rather than asserting it? Surely the argument must be better than:

1. In our world, there are conscious experiences.
2. There is a logically possible world physically identical to ours, in which the positive facts about consciousness in our world do not hold.
3. Therefore, facts about consciousness are further facts about our world, over and above the physical facts.
4. So, materialism is false. (from Chalmers, The Conscious Mind 1996)

The metaphysical certainty of the conclusion is, I think, radically out of proportion with the strength of the argument. Premise 1 is taken to be simple, whereas it is not (i.e. there are lots of hidden premises). There is an implicit adoption of realism regarding intentional properties. Premise 2 is intractably confirmed; we do not have access to a complete characterization of the physical world, nor could we (in the lifetime of our universe) explore the theorems of such a characterization to prove that facts about consciousness are not implied. Of course, Chalmers goes on to try and back his claims, but there is a deeper problem with his methodology that goes beyond this particular issue.

It is presumed that we should evaluate this argument by parsing ‘consciousness’, ‘physical’, ‘logical possibility’, etc. thus establishing necessary and sufficient conditions for their employ by appeal to our intuitions. Where we differ in intuition, further parsing takes place and so on. Rarely do we back away and ask does the initial question make sense? Does it contain a mistake? Why are we asking the question? Even more rare is the questioning of philosophical methods. What do we gain by finding the necessary and sufficient conditions for x? Do we really think we are capturing the essence of the thing? Why should we suppose that any particular definition is essential? How would we know if we had the right one?

The certainty with which many philosophers speak is stunning considering the unreliability of philosophical methods. This is not to say that philosophy aught to be abandoned, or that philosophers should simply shut-up. Rather, a bit of concern over the kinds of questions they ask and methods they employ would be helpful.

Posted by John at February 13, 2004 05:19 PM